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INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING LAKES AND BAYS
LYLE E. CRAINEt
Within the past decade the nation has experienced a growing consensus of dissatisfaction with the development and use of its lakes,
bays and estuaries. Although much of the public alarm stems from
the mounting pollution of these important water bodies, the cause
for concern goes much deeper. Particularly in those lakes and bays
where development and use pressures are great, apprehension is reinforced by recurring evidence of irrational development and a growing feeling that development forces are out of control. In such
situations criticisms often focus on institutional inadequacies, and
proposals for reform tend to center on the idea of instituting
lake/bay management.' This article is based upon an on-going exploration of the institutional aspects of managing lakes and bays.2
The presentation here will emphasize the factors involved in designing a lake/bay agency, including the scope of an agency's powers, its
geographic jurisdiction, the interactions between it and other
agencies, and the organizational form of its governing body.
Lakes and bays represent a special type of resource complex. Not
only are their component resources valuable in their own right, but
they now seem to possess additional values derived from the environment as a whole. It may be said that their perceived value often
exceeds the sum that might be derived from their water, land and air
as discrete resource components. In fact a lake or bay is a type of
environmental unit which for management purposes must be considered as a complex of resource attributes. Each attribute makes
possible specific uses and benefits which when taken collectively
constitute the resource potential of the lake or bay.
Resource attributes of lakes and bays commonly include: the
quantity and quality of the water; size and depth of the basin;
length, configuration and character of the shoreline; and the biotic
communities sustained by the land-water-air habitat. Assessment of
the resource potential of a specific lake or bay would therefore
analyze its attributes with a view to developing them according to
the ability of each attribute to support specified uses and benefits.
As a type of environment, lakes and bays also have special vulnertLyle E. Craine, Professor of Resource Planning and Conservation, School of Natural
Resources, The University of Michigan.
1. The term lake/bay is used in the adjective form throughout as a matter of convenience. By implication the term includes estuaries as they are the interface of river and
tidal systems, as in a bay. Regional institutional questions are posed most sharply in those
estuaries physiographically confined and usually referred to as bays.
2. Supported by Resources for the Future, Inc.
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ability. Their physical characteristics and location tend to make them
desirable for a variety of uses. For example, they hold particular
attraction for cottage subdivisions, marinas and recreational centers;
for commercial ports and thermal power plants; for urban centers
and affluent residences; and for municipal and industrial waste disposal, as well as for trash and garbage.
The complex of uses to which lakes and bays are subject tend to
generate several type-problems which influence the nature of the
management job and its institutional requirements. Two major problems are associated with maintaining acceptable water quality and are
distinguished from one another by the kind of residual discharged.
The first include the ecological disturbances that may be associated
with heat discharges from large thermal electric generating plants.
Since lakes and bays offer large amounts of easily accessible cooling
water, their shores are attractive sites for the new large-capacity generating plants, fired either by fossil or nuclear fuel. Thus managing
thermal discharges may become one of the more troublesome aspects
of lake/bay management. The second special water quality problem
stems from the tendency of lakes and bays to trap nutrients, persistent pesticides and other non-degradable residuals which may build
up concentrations beyond tolerable levels. Their non-degradable
characteristic means that even the smallest inputs may, in time, cause
trouble. Discharge control and treatment, even if treatment technology were available, is difficult because of the dispersion of sources
from which nutrients and pesticides may originate.
In addition to special kinds of hazards to water quality, there are
four type-problems associated with the use of shoreline. First, and
primary perhaps, are those problems stemming from the interdependencies between shoreline occupancy and water quality. Use of
the shorelands may be one of the primary determinants of amounts
and kinds of residuals generated and discharged to the water. A
second common difficulty is that of maintaining and managing
adequate public access to the water of a lake or bay. Present institutional forces appear to progressively limit to the higher income
classes the benefits arising from shoreline access. With contemporary
concern for the disadvantaged, equitable opportunity for use and
enjoyment of these water bodies seems destined to be a major issue
in lake/bay management.
A third special shoreline problem, and closely related to access, is
the preservation and management of wetlands, principally those
occurring as tidal marshes. With the increasing demand for shoreline
frontage, developers now find it more profitable to fill wetlands than
to develop alternative dry-land sites. The growing demand to preserve
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wetlands in their natural state challenges the inherited tendency to
give "land development" social priorities. Landscape values (visual)
and naturalist values (educational or recreational) are now becoming
competitive with the values associated with development alternatives.
The move to develop wetlands sparks intense conflicts which may
often dominate lake/bay management considerations as is now the
case in the Chesapeake and San Francisco Bays, among others.
A final lake/bay problem is that of preserving natural scenic
features along the shore. Prominent or unusual points of interest
often assume special scenic and esthetic importance to the entire
shoreline community. Actions to preserve special shoreline features,
as is the case in wetland preservation, often involve controversial
trade-offs between those shoreline owners who stand to gain from
preservation and those in the jurisdiction who would gain from development. Here as in the wetlands issue, these kinds of trade-offs
must be dealt with and reconciled.
This review of the type-problems suggests that the public concern
about lakes and bays arise from three factors: (1) spillover effects
from specific kinds of developments and uses; (2) perceived discrimination in the distribution of benefits or costs; and (3) loss of
faith in the ability of existing institutions to deal with spillovers and
distributional questions in ways that satisfy the public interest.
Spillovers is an operationally useful way to characterize the socialeconomic effects of the pollution problems, whether due to biodegradable organics or from heat, nutrients or persistent pesticides
which are recognized as special problems for lakes and bays. Likewise, quality degradation of the shoreline environment in general
results from spillover effects which are a function of the intensity
and design of shoreline occupancy. Ability to manage spillover
effects, whether stemming from pollution or from land use patterns
and practices, becomes a primary requirement of lake/bay management.
Discrimination in the distribution of benefits and costs arises when
any identifiable class of citizens feels it is deprived of opportunities
to which its members have rights. This factor in public dissatisfaction
is most clearly illustrated by complaints about the adequacy of free
public access and about levels of public investment for public recreation facilities and for preservation of scenic amenities. Ability to
respond to this aspect of the public's dissatisfaction is a second
primary requisite of lake/bay management.
Loss of institutional credibility is perhaps the most fundamental
of the three causes for public concern. Thus the institutional question is central and the one on which this study focusses. As used
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here, "institutions" and "institutional arrangements" refer to a definable system of public decision making, one that includes specific
organizational entities and governmental jurisdictions, but transcends
conventional emphasis upon definition of agency structure, per se. In
addition to being concerned with component organizational entities,
the term "institutions" suggests special attention to the configuration of relationships (1) established by law between individuals and
government; (2) involved in economic transactions among individuals
and groups; (3) developed to articulate legal, financial and administrative relations among public agencies; and (4) motivated by socialpsychological stimuli among groups and individuals. Specific relationships falling in any or all of these four categories, constrained and
shaped by the natural and social environment, weave a web which
describes the institutional system for decision making. Thus, institutional studies focus on the linkages which tie authority and action
centers together into a public decision making system which is responsive to the environment within which it must operate.
Clearly, few such decision making systems can now be recognized.
Therefore, the proposed definition is to some degree like a "model."
Its use for prescribing institutional reforms by necessity introduces
normative considerations. This paper will first suggest a framework
for institutional analysis and design, and then explore the factors
involved in designing a lake/bay agency.
I
3
A FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DESIGN
If the purpose of institutional arrangements is to provide a system
for making public decisions, a framework for institutional analysis
and design must consider three primary factors: (1) the nature of the
public decision expected from the institutional system; (2) the institutional environment and its capacity to make the kinds of public
decisions expected; and (3) the institutional design process.
A.

The Nature of Lake/Bay Decisions
The nature of the decisions required may be described in two
ways: in terms of the problems which appear to generate dissatisfactions with present development and use of lakes and bays; and in
terms of a concept of the job that institutions are expected to
perform.

3. Both Blair Bower (Resources for the Future, Inc.) and Ralph Luken (Department of
Geography and Environmental Engineering, Johns Hopkins University) have contributed
ideas and helpful criticisms in developing the framework. The author, however, is solely
responsible for this presentation.
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The preceding section concludes that public concern about lakes
and bays arises from two kinds of dissatisfactions: those stemming
from spillover effects of present activities; and those stemming from
alleged discrimination in the distribution of social-economic benefits
derived from development and use of a lake or bay. Individual and
group sense of injury from either is no doubt an important motivation for political action. However, both spillovers and alleged benefit
deficiencies raise two "public interest" questions that suggest better
definition of the public decisions required. One question has to do
with the level of efficiency achieved in developing and using the
resources of a lake or bay environment, and the other with the
equity among those who benefit from and pay for environmental
actions. Inefficiencies in resource use or inequities in benefit distribution appear to be the inevitable product of existing institutional
arrangements in many lakes and bays. Therefore, institutional reform
must have as its goal a decision-making capability better able to deal
simultaneously with efficiency and distributional consequences of
development and use actions.
If we are to proceed with institutional reform it is not enough to
remove the primary causes of dissatisfaction; we need also a positive
concept of the job to be done-one that can consider the full range
of development and use potentials in terms relevant to today's values
and priorities. For this purpose, it is proposed that the task be conceived as one of producing a mixture of public goods and services
from the resources of a lake/bay environment. Viewing the job as a
public production function suggests the importance of relationships
between inputs and outputs in terms of some optimal state of affairs
in which the socially valued outputs must be seen as justifying the
social costs involved in their production. Therefore the institutional
question is how to organize and manage a production function-a
process by which the various agents of society convert resources into
socially desirable goods and services according to society's preferences and with due consideration to the efficiency and equity consequences. A formulation of the job in these terms invites attention
to the adequacy of institutional devices for (1) adequately expressing
social preferences for potential outputs; (2) adequately expressing
social costs involved in the production and consumption process; and
(3) bringing expressions of preferences and costs into confrontation
before the appropriate decision making authorities.
B. The InstitutionalEnvironment
The existing institutional environment relevant to the production
of public goods and services from lakes and bays involves two inter-
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dependent decision systems: the private economic market and the
governmental system.
The American economy is based upon the concept of a competitive economic market. Accordingly there is a strong predilection
to leave the production of goods and services from natural resources
to private enterprise stimulated and constrained by the market. It is
generally believed that government is justified in intervening in the
private enterprise-market process only when there is clear evidence
that it cannot or does not satisfy public goals. Under this view,
economic theory supports the presumption that market forces induce efficient resource use. However, theory makes no claim for
market achievements regarding the distribution question. Instead distributional consequences of market allocations presumably depend
upon each person's or group's fate in the market place.
The resource complex of a lake or bay possesses certain natural,
economic and social conditions that do not satisfy the requirements
for efficient market allocations. Economic theory in fact recognizes
several types of conditions which when present tend to induce
market failures. Three such conditions characterize the production of
goods and services from lakes and bays.
The first is the fact that many aspects of a lake/bay environment
possess common property characteristics. With common property, no
individual or group can establish full title; instead such property is
presumably owned by everyone, but is the responsibility of no one.
Without ownership, transactions in property rights are limited, the
market in effect is impotent, and developments by private entrepreneurs are not likely to result in efficient resource use. The land
component of lake/bay resources perhaps possess no more commonproperty traits than does any land that can be plotted and deeded.
However, when resource attributes of lakes and bays are considered,
either singly or collectively, as the environment, the pervasiveness of
common-property characteristics will constrain the process of converting these resources into public goods and services. Where common-property characteristics dominate the inputs of production,
major public interventions in market incentives appear necessary if
the inefficiencies of laissez-faire are to be avoided.
The second condition is related and of equal significance. This is
the fact that many product and service outputs are indivisible. That
is, the output cannot be divided into units which may be withheld
from those who are not willing to pay and delivered to those who do
pay. Nor can a potential consumer who does not choose to pay the
price be excluded from enjoying the benefits financed by his neighbors. Water and air quality, improvements for fishing and navigation
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and the provision of scenic amenities are important lake/bay
products which are in a large measure indivisible. The expressions of
preference for these kinds of outputs are likely to be understated if
their satisfaction is left to a market economy since if the service is
provided, many who do not pay will also benefit.
Even though many benefit outputs are not divisible among individual consumers, many indivisible benefits can be associated with
indentifiable groups, and opportunities may exist for new forms of
organizations to express collective preferences and make per capita
allocations of collective costs. Special flood control districts, for
example, decide upon and collect a per resident assessment for an
indivisible product from water development investments. Recognition of indivisible outputs and identification of collective values associated with them may open opportunities for other similar types of
organizations to express an economic demand for a collective benefit
which present institutional arrangements seldom can fully articulate.
A third condition typical of lakes and bays which encourages
market failures is the presence of complex technical and spatial interdependencies that generate spillover effects wherever one individual
or corporation independently takes action affecting the environment.
The generation of benefits and costs external to the decision making
agent casts doubt on the resulting efficiency of resource use and on
the distributional equity of resulting benefits. Often the magnitude
and distribution of both ecological and social-economic consequences of spillovers are unknown, and if known, few if any institutional mechanisms exist for netting out the social benefits and
costs. Nor are there institutional mechanisms for recognizing distributional questions and establishing distributional goals which
would provide a basis for adjudicating equity questions. Institutional
improvements should seek various devices that will induce the decision system to seek an understanding of the net social consequences
of potential spillover effects.
In spite of our strong cultural preference for the market as an
institution for resource allocation, the government has progressively
intervened in the production of goods and services associated with
development and use of lakes and bays. For example, from the early
days of the Nation, navigation has been considered a matter of
national interest, and since the middle of the nineteenth century the
federal government has been responsible for improving and maintaining navigable waterways. Protection of water quality and the maintenance of fisheries have in recent decades involved the federal as
well as state authorities, whereas local governments are the primary
producers of such municipal services as water supply and waste-water
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disposal. Thus a progression of governmental intervention has resulted in a variety of federal, state and local activities that deal with
or affect the quantity and quality of outputs from the resources of a
lake or bay.
A review of existing institutions involved in decisions disclose significant features which fail to conform to the natural, social and
economic imperatives inherent in lake and bay environments. For
example, existing institutions are characterized by: (1) a heavy
dependence upon private enterprise for the production of goods and
services from lake/bay resources in spite of conditions adverse to
market operations, such as the dominance of common-property
characteristics, the tendency for outputs to be indivisible among
beneficiaries and the frequency of significant spillovers from independent developments and uses; (2) a highly fragmented governmental authority controlling resource use and development, thus
providing little unity in purpose or methods of public intervention
and failing to fully respond to the decision requirements imposed by
common property, indivisible outputs and spillovers which presumably justified intervention in the first place; and (3) a common
incongruence between jurisdictions of general government and environmental problem-areas, thus inhibiting efforts to integrate
management within the context of the lake/bay region. These characteristics are the product of a deeply entrenched favoritism for private
enterprise and small jurisdictions of government.
Given this general institutional posture and the natural, social and
economic imperatives of environmental resources, it is not surprising
that our existing institutions fail to meet performance standards
required by today's lake/bay problems. Building institutional capability will require further intervention by government in what has
essentially been laissez-faire, in the public as well as in the private
sector.
The InstitutionalDesign Process
The process of designing institutions for lake/bay management as
set forth herein is built upon an expansion of the idea of public
intervention in the production of goods and services from lakes and
bays. Existing institutional arrangements represent particular forms
of public intervention and the present "consensus of dissatisfaction"
includes demands for changes in the extent and manner of that intervention. New forms of intervention, if they are to result in improved
lake/bay decisions, should compensate (1) for lack of private enterprise's capacity to deal with certain environmental problems, and (2)
for the fragmentation of public authorities, which are relevant to
C
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lake/bay management. It is here postulated, first, that public support
for changes in the extent and manner of intervention in a given lake
or bay environment will be based upon the belief that the present
output is sufficiently inconsistent with public expectation regarding
efficiency and distribution to justify intervention, and second, that
the judgment of "sufficiency" involves three specific considerations:
(1) the social costs of status quo; (2) the social costs of the intervention proposed; and (3) the degree of certainty that the output
consequent of the proposed change will be more satisfactory. None
of these factors is subject to absolute measurement. Public perception of these factors should nonetheless be controlling as to whether
an intervention proposal finds support or not.
Public intervention is effectuated through a limited set of legaladministrative authorities, the product of relevant law-making
processes. Such authorizations may be thought of as intervention
techniques-the primary devices by which government can intervene
to change behavior of those individuals, corporations or agencies of
the public that have privileges or responsibilities regarding the development and use of lakes and bays. In terms of managing the
environment of a lake or bay, five types of intervention techniques
appear most relevant. These are, the authority to: (1) generate and
disseminate information relevant to the development and use of a
lake or bay; (2) conduct surveys and prepare plans for developing
and controlling the environment in a lake/bay region; (3) regulate the
development and use of the lake/bay resources; (4) require transfer
payments among development and use agents based upon a benefit
or damage quid pro quo; and (5) produce, by publicly managed
enterprise, specified environmental benefits. Intervention techniques
to be operationally useful for institutional evaluation and design
must be described in terms of specific powers to act in behalf of the
public, with clear definition of the conditions and limitations upon
the action agent.
Each technique is most often exercised independently of the
others. That fact is what is meant by fragmentation of governmental
organizations dealing with lakes and bays. Although historically,
independent exercise of intervention powers is understandable, in
circumstances of intense development pressures such as characterize
many lakes and bays today, administrative fragmentation limits the
effectiveness with which these intervention devices can be brought to
bear upon the problems of a specific lake or bay. Thus, as used in
this article, lake/bay management means a capacity to exercise intervention powers in such a way that they can be made supportive of
one another when applied in a specific lake or bay. The need and
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potential for such support will differ with each specific circumstance
and therefore will vary from place to place and from time to time.
Not all, in fact probably relatively few, lakes and bays require a
management agency in the sense that all administrative powers relevant to the five types of intervention are exercised by a regional
lake/bay agency. Many, if not most circumstances, may indicate a
lake/bay agency of much more limited powers, sharing its decision
responsibilities in varying degree with established agencies and jurisdictions of general government. In such situations, designing an institutional system requires delineating the role of each agency in the
process of administering each of the primary intervention powers.
Delineating an institutional system for lake/bay management,
therefore, involves two interdependent considerations. The first concerns the role of various jurisdictions of general government-federal,
state, counties, and municipalities-particularly the kinds of intervention powers they may be motivated to enact. The second concerns the nature of a lake/bay agency, including the scope of powers
delegated to it, its geographic jurisdiction, the operational linkages
between it and other agencies and its organizational form.
The design process as conceived herein, deals with sets of interactions among three primary institutional determinants and four
institutional elements. These are depicted in Figure 1 in which the
choice of intervention objectives is represented as the primary step in
determining institutional requirements. Intervention objectives however are conditioned by the environmental conditions and problems
of the lake or bay, as well as by the political climate relevant to its
use and development. Intervention objectives, therefore, become the
primary determinant of the scope of intervention powers which is
the basic element in constructing the institutional arrangements for a
specific lake or bay. Although determining the scope of powers may
be the key step in institutional design, it is clear that none of the
four institutional elements can be determined without reference to
decisions about the others. Accordingly, the choice of institutional
arrangements results from concurrent considerations of the scope of
the agency's powers, its geographic jurisdiction, the kinds of operational linkages between the agency and other governmental units,
and the form which the lake/bay organization will take.
The "mainstream" of the design process is qualified by two significant, even though secondary, inputs. These essentially are the
influence of environmental conditions and problems and of the
political climate. It seems clear that the political climate will be
significantly influenced by the public's perception of environmental
conditions and of the problems giving rise to public concern.
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FIGURE 1

Process of Designing Institutional Arrangements
for Lakes and Bays

Although environmental conditions and political climate are central
in determining intervention objectives, they presumably may also
have a direct, even though secondary, influence upon choosing the
scope of the agency's powers. Likewise, the political climate will
have direct effects upon choosing the geographic scope as well as the
organizational form of a lake/bay agency; and the physical, economic
and social conditions of the lake or bay may directly influence the
kinds of interagency relationships that may be required.
The ultimate decisions regarding scope of intervention powers,
geographic jurisdiction, interagency linkages, and organization form
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of a lake/bay agency result in what is herein called an intervention
strategy. Thus, the choice of institutional arrangements and the
choice of an intervention strategy are reciprocal decisions. Accordingly, institutional arrangements may be thought of as an expression
of intervention; but at the same time, the process of designing institutional arrangements in effect becomes a process of devising
strategy and providing the instruments for its implementation.
Choosing appropriate intervention strategies is the basic decision
which confronts the political process relevant to development and
use of lakes and bays.
II
DESIGNING A LAKE/BAY AGENCY

The framework for institutional analysis and design recognizes
that a wide range in intervention strategies may be appropriate, depending upon environmental and political variables in the particular
lake or bay under consideration. The remainder of the present paper
will explore the nature of interactions among the determinants and
elements of intervention strategies as those interactions may be disclosed in the process of designing a strategy for a lake or bay.
A.

Determinants of Strategy and Design
1. Environmental Conditions and Problems
Of the three determinants, environmental conditions and problems
are basic. It has been emphasized in Part I that use-potentials of lakes
and bays depend upon various specific attributes of the body of
water and its particular setting. Further it was suggested that
although lakes and bays present a generic class of environmental
problems, wide variations in their specific problems are displayed
within each class. A first step in the process of designing an institutional strategy for a specific environment is, therefore a careful
analysis of the resource attributes and the problems associated with
their development and use. Special attention should be given to
formulating problems in terms relevant to intervention strategy, that
is, in terms of actions and their consequences with regard to resource
allocation and benefit distribution.
Support for changes in governmental intervention in a given lake
or bay depends upon the public's perception of the nature of its
problems. The present study has suggested that demands for changes
in governmental involvement in lakes and bays derive from (1) perceived deficiencies in kind, quantity, quality and distribution of
some product or service, and/or (2) significant spillover effects in the
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present process of developing and using the environment. Specific
expressions of these types of problems in any given environment
should be identified and their origins analyzed as a prerequisite to
determining intervention objectives, management powers and organizational arrangements required. Such analysis makes it possible (1) to
pin-point efficiency and distributional consequences of service deficiencies as well as of spillover effects; and (2) to better prescribe
the kinds of procedural linkages among producers, consumers and
public authorities in the several sectors of benefit outputs, and between the lake/bay agency and jurisdictions of general government
necessary to ameliorate service deficiencies and spillover effects.
Unveiling of the actual efficiency and equity consequences gets
very near to the basic nerve centers of the political process. Analysis
of specific problems, their origins, and their efficiency and equity
consequences may alter the public's perception which may in turn
affect the political climate.
2. Intervention Objectives
With analysis of the problems of a lake or bay, it is possible to
propose specific intervention objectives in terms relevant to the basic
criteria for institutional performance, namely efficient use of the
resources and equitable distribution of benefits and costs associated
with their development and use. This may be illustrated by the "wetland" issue which frequently emerges in lake/bay management and is
of particular significance, for example, in both Chesapeake Bay and
San Francisco Bay.
Wetlands along the shorelines of lakes and bays are often a special
resource attribute. They may produce several types of social utility.
The principal ones include (1) habitat for aquatic life essential to the
production of fish, and other sea-foods, and for waterfowl, both
resident and transitory; (2) sites for collecting and/or studying wildlife for pleasure or for scientific purposes; (3) scenic amenities associated with their aquatic meadows and their wildlife; (4)
potential conversion to dry land; and (5) disposal sites for solid
wastes. The wetland problem stems from the fact that filling to
produce shore front property, now in great demand in the real estate
market, is more profitable to private entrepreneurs than the production of other potential benefits of wetlands. Present institutions
are unable to reflect either market value associated with common
property aspects of wetlands or the non-market values, both public
and private, associated with their use for other than filling and development purposes.
These facts have both efficiency and distributional consequences

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

which fire the policy controversy. However, these consequences are
seldom if ever made sufficiently explicit that specific intervention
objectives can be formulated. Basic to identifying efficiency and distributional consequences is the recognition that the benefits to
others (individuals and public) which are foregone by land development of wetlands should be viewed as development costs, just as
benefits foregone as a result of industrial and municipal pollution
should be included in production costs. Significant social costs could
stem from three types of foregone benefits, those benefits which
would otherwise accrue to (1) producers and consumers of sea foods;
(2) individuals valuing scenery, recreation and scientific uses of the
wetlands; and (3) some "publics" which attach an undifferentiated
value to the protection and preservation of wetlands.
Until these social costs are brought into calculations leading to the
choice between production of dry land or preservation of the wetlands, the presumption must be that the market demand for filling
wetland may be artificially high, and that more wetlands may be
allocated to development than is socially optimal. Accordingly,
under present institutional arrangements, wherever controversy regarding wetland conversion is found, the efficiency with which the
wetland resources are used is open to serious question.
Similar analyses of distributional consequences is both desirable
and possible. The chains of both costs and benefits are significant,
not only for the direct consequences of developing the wetlands, but
also for the consequences of this action upon other uses and the
resultant foregone benefits. The significant distribution question
which is basic to formulating intervention objectives is: "Who bears
the individual and/or public costs stemming from other uses and
benefits being pre-empted by filling the wetlands?"
3. The Political Climate
Although analysis of efficiency and distributional consequences
resulting from existing institutional processes makes possible a more
specific prescription of intervention objectives, analytically derived
objectives may not be viable under contemporary structure of
politics. The political climate therefore is a third major determinant
of intervention strategy and institutional design. In some instances
local and state politics with strong emphasis upon property rights,
economic development and "tax base" may be dominant and local
preservation groups may be poorly organized. In such situations
preservation values may have attracted more regional or national
interest, and some form of federal or regional agency may be called
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for in order to assure actions based upon consideration of all values
involved.
Seldom will the relevant political climate be limited by any
regional demarcation for lake/bay management. Local, state, regional
and national politics interplay upon any specific lake/bay situation
to create the political climate within which intervention objectives
and strategies must find their viability. The political factor may have
its primary influence, from an analytical point, upon the formulation
of intervention objectives. However, in practice it may be equally
effective in shaping the institutional elements, particularly in determining the scope of intervention powers for a regional agency and
the organizational form it should take.
B. Elements of InstitutionalDesign
1. Scope of Intervention Powers
Just as the choice of intervention objectives is the focus of the
three determinants, so too the selection of intervention powers to be
delegated to the lake/bay agency may be the primary institutional
element in an intervention strategy. Thus, analytically, the prescription of intervention objectives and the determination of the powers
to be given the lake/bay agency are the first steps in developing
institutional arrangements for a lake or bay.
The kind and scope of intervention powers that might appropriately be delegated to such a regional management agency range
over a wide spectrum. Of the several factors entering into the choice,
the nature of the environmental problem and of the intervention
objective is primary. But identification of problems and intervention
objectives may give little guidance to the question of how those
powers should be distributed among agencies. Two criteria are
critical in determining the extent to which intervention powers
should be delegated to a single lake/bay agency. The first is agency
motivation, and the second is need for integration and flexibility of
decision making in the regional lake/bay situation.
Clearly, the motivational incentives of an agency are a prime
factor in whether an authority once granted by a legislative body is
actually used. Alleged deficiencies in the provision of mass recreational opportunities, for example, may stem from the fact that
agencies possessing the powers to develop and manage recreational
facilities find their political support from a relatively small but influential minority which is primarily interested in specialized recreation. In a similar manner, many failures of states to use effectively
their regulatory powers over pollution may stem from built-in polit-
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ical incentives to show more concern for the interests of the generator of pollution than for those who suffer the consequences,
especially where consequences are widespread and not dramatically
evident. Raising the motivation question in cases of alleged failure to
use existing intervention authorities helps to sharpen the problem
and to identify possible institutional solutions. In some instances
motivation now lacking in an established agency may be obtained by
transferring the authority or some aspect of it to a lake/bay agency.
Unfortunately, motivational factors in agency behavior are not now
well understood and solutions may necessarily involve trial and error.
The need for integration and management flexibility usually will
require delegating some significant part of intervention powers to the
regional agency. Regional command of the five primary types of
intervention "tools" represents the acme of lake/bay management.
Ability to substitute one "tool" for another, to use one "tool" to
reinforce another, or at least to avoid impairing the effectiveness of
other intervention powers, is perhaps the essence of the idea of management. The extent to which this institutional feature is desirable
and viable for a given lake/bay environment again will be affected by
the nature of the problems and intervention objectives, and by the
countervailing disadvantages associated with regional unification of
intervention powers. Objections to regional unification may be
expressed as issues of bureaucratic jurisdiction. However, there are
real disadvantages that deserve consideration
Well established governmental agencies usually represent a functional centralization of federal or state authority. From the perspective of a region, functional centralization may appear as an
intolerable fragmentation of power; but proposals to delegate powers
to a lake/bay agency may be seen as threats to established agencies
and the clientele they serve. Regional delegation of powers may also
incur social costs by foregoing benefits from state or federal centralization of management power. For example, benefits from
centralization may be realized from the greater equity in the administration of authorities relating to such issues as civil rights and
income distribution. Likewise benefits may result from the ability to
coordinate the exercise of powers to intervene in lakes and bays with
the administration of legal authorities relating to other sectors, such
as national defense, transportation, energy supply and economic
development. It may be argued, therefore, that when functional
centralization is compromised by regional delegation of powers to a
lake/bay agency there may be significant negative side effects. These
must be considered as off-sets to any gains from regionalization of
management authority. Undesirable administrative side-effects may
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be avoided or reduced by central and regional agencies sharing in the
exercise of specified powers. The discussion of interagency linkages,
below, suggests the greater use of procedural requirements to effectuate "authority sharing" in the exercise of specified intervention
powers.
Trade offs between functional centralization and regional unification of powers are often difficult to assess. The advantages of maintaining existing arrangements may easily be exaggerated by the
normal tendency to support the status quo, particularly by those
who have learned to "work through" the present power structure to
achieve their economic interests. The advantages to be gained from
regional integration of the management tools are primarily in the
indefinite realm of hopes and expectations. Thus, support for building management strength into a lake/bay agency may be greatly
influenced not only by public perception of the nature and severity
of the problem but also by its perception of the prospects of
achieving the advantages claimed for delegations to such a regional
agency.
2. Geographic Jurisdiction
The geographic jurisdiction for lake/bay management may influence and in turn be affected by the scope of management powers
which a lake/bay agency may appropriately exercise. The boundary
question has proven to be difficult in most regional planning and
management efforts, and it is no less so for lake/bay management.
The difficulty of delineating regional boundaries for lake/bay management stems from the fundamental geographic disconformity
among regions demarcated by (1) the natural-technological systems,
i.e. hydrologic, physiographic and ecological, which set the resource
potentials and limitations; (2) social-economic systems, i.e. the
market and other behavioral incentives, which generate the advantages and disadvantages from alternative courses of action; and
(3) governmental systems, i.e. the political process and legal and
administrative forms and procedures, which determine what is acceptable or adoptable.4
Natural regions are for all practical purposes immutable. Social,
economic and political boundaries are in fact man made and, within
constraints, can be adjusted. For lakes and bays, the boundary problem may be approached with the question: "To what extent can the
jurisdiction of a lake/bay agency conform to the natural systems
primarily involved?" Further, "Under what conditions must a
4. The characterization of the three systems is adopted from Walter Firey, Man, Mind
and Land: A Theory of Resource Use 19-55 (1960).
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lake/bay agency have jurisdiction coterminous with the hydrologic
system, and under what conditions can interdependences between
natural processes and social, economic and political forces be effectively expressed and reconciled by various institutional linkages?"
Attempts to organizationally internalize spillover effects from river
to receiving waters may result in an organizational monstrosity. A
more effective institutional response might be found, for example, in
providing for inter-regional regulation or for inter-regional transfer
payments to moderate significant spillover effects.
The Susquehanna River which is a part of the hydrologic system
of Chesapeake Bay is illustrative. There is reason to doubt that a
Chesapeake Bay Agency should extend its jurisdiction to comprehend the Susquehanna Basin. If standards for quality and
quantity discharge from the river to the bay can be established and
enforced, there would appear to be little reason to organizationally
internalize bay and river management. A similar situation may inhere
regarding San Francisco Bay and the inflows from the Sacramento
and San Joaquin Rivers. Water discharges to lakes and bays from
smaller drainages may or may not be subject to the same type of
institutional differentiation. Variables other than size probably enter
into determining a lake/bay jurisdiction, but these are little understood.
A reciprocal relationship between bays and rivers may also operate, even though less obviously, in the case of anadromous fish
runs. An anadromous fishery may be a widely scattered operation,
extending beyond the bay and into the international waters of the
open ocean where the primary harvest takes place. At the same time,
the fishery is dependent upon spawning runs reaching far into the
upper tributary drainage systems. River management actions on
anadromous spawning streams may damage or enhance international
fisheries; reciprocally fishing practices in open ocean may damage or
enhance inland fisheries. In this case, administrative internalization
seems obviously impractical. Yet institutional arrangements are
needed to provide machinery through which (1) fishing regulations
pertaining to ocean waters are required to reflect national and
regional interests in the inland fisheries as well as ocean fisheries, and
(2) river basin development is required to consider the effects of
dams and reservoirs upon ocean fisheries as well as upon those residents of the river basin.
Undoubtedly there are also situations where a lake or bay as a
physiographic-hydrologic system is unnecessarily large for the jurisdiction of a management agency. Both Chesapeake Bay and the
Great Lakes, for example, show evidence of conditions that would
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question the effectiveness of a "basin-wide" administrative instrument to deal with oxygen depletion associated with discharge of
organic wastes. Even where organic discharges tend to have severe
local effects, the quality degradation may not extend through the
entire body of water. Particularly in the case of serrated shorelines
such as characterize Chesapeake Bay, pronounced by relatively small
embayments are often the sites for concentrated settlements and
thus the primary receiving waters for municipal and industrial wastes.
If the waters of the embayments have a retarded exchange with the
larger body of water, it is possible to develop extreme deficiencies in
dissolved oxygen with relatively small effects upon the larger body of
water. This water quality behavior is illustrated in the Great Lakes by
the case of Green Bay, Traverse Bay and Saginaw Bay, each of which,
it might be said, tends to display its own water quality system with
only limited spillovers to the Lakes as a whole.
A more unique kind of sub-lake water quality system seems to
characterize Southern Lake Michigan. A counterclockwise current in
the southern portion of the lake appears to activate a circular flow
system, moving Milwaukee's discharge south to be augmented (as it is
subject to oxidation) by Kenosha, Racine and parts of Northern
Illinois Metro not served by the Greater Chicago Metropolitan
Sanitary District, then eastward to pick up discharges from Gary and
Hammond in Indiana and northward to St. Joseph, Grand Haven and
Muskegon in Michigan. The current then swings across the lake to the
vicinity of Milwaukee at which point a major part apparently starts
its southward flow again.
The existence of a relatively isolated water quality system within a
larger hydrologic system makes it both possible and desirable to take
action through a regional institutional mechanism of more restricted
functional and geographic jurisdiction than the entire lake or bay. It
has been suggested, for example, that a sub-regional commission
might be more effective in dealing with the water quality system in
southern Lake Michigan than the Great Lakes Basin Commission
itself, especially from the standpoint of State and local participation.' First, the problem is of primary concern to only four of the
eight states represented on the Great Lakes Basin Commission; and
second, several important local authorities are directly involved
which have reason to feel inadequately represented by the state
members of the present commission. A sub-regional commission in
this situation (presumably operating within general policies and
guidelines acceptable to a Great Lakes Basin Commission) will make
S. Craine, The Great Lakes: Present Management Practices and Related Problems, (Program paper AAAS Dec. 30, 1970).
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possible more direct representation from both the states and local
authorities, and might be expected to develop a more viable arrangement for water quality management than existing institutions
provide.
In the above discussion, the natural-technological system has
served as a point of departure for considering the factors affecting
the geographic jurisdiction of a lake/bay agency. In this frame of
reference, spillover effects stemming from physical interdependencies
are the major consideration in delineating agency boundaries.
Another approach may disclose other consequences of equal importance. For example, disconformity between governmental jurisdictions and social-economic systems, such as in an urban region,
may generate incentives for inefficient resource use or for deficiencies in output of goods and services from lakes and bays. When
the taxing jurisdiction does not coincide with the area of socialeconomic impacts from a tax-supported expenditure, a distorted
demand for public goods is likely to result, since there is some discrepancy between those who receive the benefits and those who pay.
This problem is generic to intergovernmental relations where a
broader jurisdiction of government provides services from general tax
funds to residents of an area which does not coincide with the taxing
government's domain. This kind of situation may be illustrated by
federal and state subsidies for local flood control, pollution abatement, recreation, etc. The search for an understanding and solution
to the problem prompts Mancur Olson to offer his principle of
"fiscal equivalence" which suggests a separate organization for every
collective good or service with a boundary problem, so there can
more nearly be a match between those who receive the benefits and
those who pay. 6
How regional organizations based upon fiscal equivalence might
relate to those based upon internalizing spillover from physical interdependencies is a remaining question. Their geographic jurisdictions
could be quite disparate. It should be noted, however, that one is
essentially resource oriented and the other service oriented. Within
the concept of a production function as suggested in Part I, two such
jurisdictions can be viewed in an input (resource)-output (service)
relationship. Under such a view, the organizations should be
articulated so that the service oriented agency primarily expresses the
collective preference in terms of the collective willingness to pay, and
the resource agency primarily reacts to preference and price expressions in terms of resource availability and associated production
6. Olson, The Principle of "Fiscal Equivalence". The Division of Responsibilitiesamong
Different Levels of Government, 59 Am. Econ. Rev. 479-87 (1968).
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costs. Although differentiation of the two kinds of agencies is an
idealized formulation of the problem solution, the distinction between the essential functions implied by resource management and
those implied by providing a service should be valuable in considering
both the geographic jurisdiction, powers and interagency linkages of
a lake/bay agency.'
3. Interagency Linkages
A vital element and one of growing significance to institutional
arrangements is the set of linkages8 that may be prescribed to govern
operating relationships between a lake/bay agency and other relevant
decision centers. Thus, for example, if service agencies and resource
agencies (as distinguished immediately above) were articulated by a
system of monetary exchange for services rendered, this would serve
as an interagency linkage that would encourage the agencies to play
complementary instead of conflicting roles. Other linkages of a
regulatory nature might be prescribed between relatively independent producers, public or private, and state or federal regulatory
authorities. Or a linkage might prescribe (whether by law, administrative regulations or standards) circumstances under which a government of general jurisdiction can intervene and modify an action
which a lake/bay agency is empowered to take.
A primary determinant of linkage requirements is the degree and
manner in which intervention powers are assigned to a regional
agency. Accordingly the set of linkages appropriate for a lake/bay
agency may differ from place to place and for different stages of
development. Certainly the need for a highly unified regional command of management tools is greater where there are pressures for
more outputs with consequent aggravation of spillovers, than in
water bodies subject to less intense environmental pressures. For
example, the problems of Tampa Bay, San Francisco Bay, Long
Island Sound and many intensively developed inland lakes suggest
the need for a high degree of regional integration and flexibility in
applying the whole range of intervention powers. Varying degrees of
integration and flexibility may, however be indicated for less developed areas, ranging all the way from none or few in such bodies as
Hudson Bay and the Bay of Fundy, to varying fractions of regional
7. The idea of differentiating the function of resource management from that of providing a service was prompted by Warren, A Municipal Services Market Model of Metropolitan Organization, 30 J. Am. Institute of Planners, 193-204 (1964).
8. The term "linkage" is here used as in mechanical systems to connote specified cause
and effect relationships. Thus, Webster's New World Dictionary offers as one definition:
"Linkage,... a system or series of links; especially, a series of connecting rods for transmitting power or motion."
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integration in such situations as may now be represented by the
Great Lakes and Chesapeake Bay.
Regardless of the degree of delegation to the lake/bay agency,
governments of general jurisdiction might appropriately continue to
influence the development and use of a lake or bay through some
sharing in the exercise of intervention powers. Interagency linkages
are the devices by which such sharing is made explicit. They may be
expressed by legislative or administrative provisions regarding interagency behavior which tie relevant decision centers-whether they be
governments of general jurisdiction, their specific agencies, regional
authorities or other public or private groups-into an institutional
system for governing the development and use of lakes and bays. In
general, linkages will prescribe specifically: (1) the constraints under
which the lake/bay agency may take action and (2) the extent to
which actions taken by a lake/bay agency are constraints upon other
decision centers.
In situations favoring the delegation of a wide scope of intervention powers to the region, the lake/bay agency might, for
example, be given unlimited powers to initiate actions subject only
to three types of constraints. The first might be the reserved rights of
the delegating authority (presumably federal or state) to review and
approve; to receive appeals, hold hearings thereon and veto regional
actions; or to rescind delegations upon findings of malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance. The second is the constraint that may be
imposed by requirements for funding, including conditions required
of the lake/bay agency in order to benefit from interagency fund
transfers such as grants-in-aid, or payments for benefits or damages
stemming from interagency spillovers. A third type of constraint is
that exercised when superior powers are granted to other agencies to
establish parameters or standards to which lake/bay agency actions
must conform.
Where a lake or bay presents an opposite situation, i.e. favors very
limited regional delegation of intervention powers, quite a different
set of linkages is suggested. In this situation, it may be presumed that
initiation of action, particularly in regulation, funding and direct
action, is likely to be dispersed among different agencies of general
purpose government. The imperative, therefore, is to prescribe linkages that make it possible for a lake/bay agency to impose constraints in behalf of regional integration of development and use of
the lake or bay resources. Some features of this type situation tend
to characterize existing institutional arrangements about which we
now despair; but these arrangements appear to have given little atten-
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tion to a system of interagency linkages designed to encourage the
agencies to play complementary instead of conflicting roles.
A design process that recognizes the relationship between regionalization of intervention powers and interagency linkages in turn
invites consideration of an array of options for a lake/bay agency.
Two extreme hypothetical situations will illustrate. A situation favoring a highly unified regional command of management powers represents an option in which the lake/bay organization may perform as a
management agency in the true sense. This institutional pattern appears to be what many have in mind when they respond to current
institutional deficiencies with a call for lake/bay management. At the
opposite extreme, we may posit a situation where there is little justification or support for lake/bay management in the sense that term is
used in this study, but there may be both justification and support
for the development of a regional policy regarding use and development of the lake or bay environment. In this kind of situation the
more appropriate response may be a lake/bay agency designed to
reconcile and unify different interests regarding use and development
goals, to promulgate use and development standards and to monitor
operating agencies for their conformance with such standards. In this
case the institutional strategy may more appropriately be characterized as regional governance of lake/bay matters, rather than
lake/bay management.
Situations favoring lake/bay governance call for an agency devoted
to developing a sense of community, to articulating collective preferences of the lake/bay citizenry, and to establishing grassroots norms
that should govern the behavior of component units of the regional
community. A fundamental responsibility of such an agency might,
for example, be the development, adoption and adjudication of a
"lake/bay constitution." 9 A lake/bay agency devoted to regional
governance should be so constituted that it can legitimately speak for
its lake/bay constituency. Such an agency might also be expected to
prepare and maintain a development and use plan and to take leadership in negotiations with agencies of general government regarding
their contribution to achieving the plan. The concept of regional
governance suggests different interagency linkages from those associated with contemporary efforts for "regional coordination" as
established by national river basin development policy. The significance of lake/bay governance for the form of regional organization will be explored in the following section.
9. An idea adopted from a proposal for metropolitan areas by Piers Von Simson, Toward
a City Constitution, The Center Magazine, Jan./Feb. 1971, at 72-74.
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4. Organizational Form
The framework suggests that the form a lake/bay agency takes is a
product of interactions among powers assigned to the agency, the
geographic jurisdiction of the agency and the institutional linkages
prescribed.
Whether a lake/bay agency is cast in the role of a management
agency or as an instrument of regional governance, its unique contribution and its central concern will be with the articulation of
local-regional perspective. Regardless of the scope of powers delegated to it, the agency must, therefore, give expression of regional
interests to allocation of lake/bay resources and in the distribution of
benefits and costs incurred in the development and use of those
resources. It must also have the capacity to take the leadership in
reconciling these interests within state and federal policy parameters.
Given this condition of its existence, the nature and method of representation becomes paramount.
Presumably therefore the governing body should be responsive to
the legitimate regional interests (the cost bearers as well as the beneficiaries) in the development and use of the lake/bay environment.
The question then is raised as to whether the members of the governing body should be the direct representatives of interest groups, or
whether they should be indirectly represented through responsible
spokesmen of established units of local or state governments. Closely
related to this consideration is the question of whether the representatives are chosen by election or appointment.
Unfortunately there are few regional prototypes to which we can
refer. The development of river basin and watershed agencies, perhaps the nearest analogy, has to date largely depended upon appointed representatives of relevant governments or governmental
agencies. River basin commissions established under the Water Planning Act of 1965 have representatives of each interested federal
agency as well as of the Governor of each state within the Commission's jurisdiction, while the Delaware River Basin Commission,
established under a specific federal-state compact, has a single federal
representative who serves with the Governors of the four states. A
similar approach to representation is commonly taken for intra-state
watersheds. Enabling legislation in the several states tends to favor
governing boards representing units of local government and/or state
agencies. Doubts may be raised as to whether members appointed to
represent established agencies will be sufficiently responsive to some
groups, particularly those concerned with local impacts and those
spokesmen for non-market environmental values.
An agency governed by representatives of relevant jurisdictions

July 19711

MANAGING LAKES AND BAYS

and agencies of government may be thought of as a "joint body,"
organized to achieve collectively the mutual goals and objectives of
its member governmental units. Such a body might be expected to
operate primarily by negotiating agreements among its members.
Resolution of issues to which all members are a party would likely
require unanimity of the members. A "joint body" will sense its
political responsibility only through established political-administrative channels. Accordingly, the existing power structure may feel
less threatened and may generate less resistance to the agency's
creation than would be expected if the regional board or commission
were to be elected directly by the people in the region. On the other
hand, a lake/bay agency so governed may act with more constraint in
formulating new policies and with greater timidity in making the
hard decisions. In short such an agency is likely to be less innovative
in confronting problems and finding solutions than a commission
composed of representatives elected by the people in the region. A
governing body of elected representatives may, therefore, be indicated if there are indications of bureaucratic rigidity or doubts that
legislative bodies of established governments are responsive of all
relevant lake/bay interests.
What purpose is representation expected to serve in the mechanism for producing goods and services from the resources of a lake or
bay? In the earlier analysis, it was recognized that existing institutional arrangements seem to support a "steady state" characterized
by deficiencies in goods and services and by spillover effects. Both of
these characteristics raise doubts as to the efficiency with which
resources are being used and the equity with which the social benefits and costs are distributed among individuals and groups in society.
It was also recognized that the status quo is reinforced by institutional arrangements which tend to give relatively greater influence to
groups whose value structure gives priorities to navigation, fishing,
industrial and general riparian land development, and fail to give
proportional influence to other groups that place priorities upon
public recreation, visual amenities, pollution-free air and water,
orderly use of space and redistribution of the tax burden. In terms of
the "public interest," the concern is that the probable incidence of
benefits and costs, under existing arrangements does not encourage a
socially efficient use of resources, nor can the distributional consequences be justified on equity grounds.
It is in this context that the question of representation on the
management board of a lake/bay agency has fundamental importance. The goal is to develop rules for representation which will
redress the balance of influence among relevant interests. Given the
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goal, the question becomes how? Two directions for corrective
actions are possible. First, changes in the basis of representation and
in the method of selection (i.e., election rules) within existing structure of general Government may give voice to groups now under
represented. For example, the "one person, one vote" ruling of the
Supreme Court is already a significant countervailing force to previously rural dominated state legislatures. Similarly, election changes
designed to improve equity of general representation in local governments within a lake or bay region may satisfy the representation
question and improve the credibility of a joint regional agency composed of delegates from governments and agencies.
Second, if adjustments in representation rules for jurisdictions of
general government fail to redress the balance, then consideration
may turn to a governing board directly representative of the people
in the area. Such a step may improve the capacity of the regional
agency to deal responsibly with allocation of regional resources
among the several output sectors within the agency's jurisdiction and
concern. However, it will be challenged by those who are concerned
about the proliferation of units of special government. There undoubtedly are problems associated with the creation of units of
special government. These difficulties should be considered and
faced, but their existence need not at this stage rule out an elected
governing body as a means of achieving the representation and influence in solving lake and bay problems.
To date we have had few if any guidelines for prescribing representation on deliberative decision-making bodies. Intuitive rules of
represenation may inadvertently produce a power structure inimical
to the goals sought. The effectiveness of representatives in expressing
preferences and in carrying a properly weighted influence into decision councils is a function of many variables. Unfortunately, the
interdependencies among these variables are not sufficiently understood to provide a basis for definitive guidelines. However, recent
research is promising and may now provide helpful insights regarding
representation on the governing board of a lake/bay agency.' 0
III
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The adequacy of the Nation's public institutions is being called
into question in many if not most areas of public affairs. Organizational tinkering no longer satisfies the discontent. The questioning
goes to basic premises of our culture and it calls for a fundamental
10. See Haefle, Environmental Quality as a Problem of Social Choice, a paper presented
to RFF Forum on Research on Environmental Quality (June 1970).
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reassessment of the institutions needed to respond to contemporary
problems and challenges.
Environmental quality has emerged as a sector of public affairs in
which discontent and institutional challenges are marked. The study
on which this paper is based undertakes to explore an approach to a
fundamental reassessment of institutional needs for dealing with one
type of environmental unit-that represented by lakes and bays. The
study postulates a framework for institutional analysis and design
synthesized from cultural premises, theoretical concepts and normative assumptions which are made explicit to the extent they are
known and identifiable.
Four principal components of the framework are: (1) definition of
the problems of lakes and bays which prompt the present state of
dissatisfaction; (2) definition of the job to be done in terms of the
perspective of society as a whole; (3) definition of institutional
policy based upon the premise that questions of public intervention
in status quo are central to policy choices and institutional arrangements; and (4) definition of the social-political process of institutional design. The present paper proceeds to explore the questions
raised and problems confronted in applying the institutional design
process to establishing a lake/bay agency.
From exploring the process of designing a lake/bay agency several
preliminary conclusions or observations may be noted. First, it became evident early in the study that there is no one right institutional pattern for managing lakes and bays. This perception was
reinforced again and again in the process of thinking through the
framework for institutional analysis and design. Rather than an
organization or a pattern of institutional arrangements, the appropriate institutional response will vary from situation to situation.
Accordingly, the study turned to identifying variables influencing
institutional strategy for specific lake/bay circumstances. The variety
of regional institutional forms is postulated to range from a regional
management agency with extensive powers to plan and regulate and
to finance and operate projects, to an instrument of regional governance in which the lake/bay agency would concentrate on developing
regional goals regarding lake/bay use and articulating the interests of
the lake/bay community.
Accepting the premise that there may be a range of lake/bay organizations appropriate to varying circumstances leads to a second
conclusion that the operational linkages between the lake/bay agency
and other relevant agencies of general government should be a major
concern of institutional design. In fact, it might be claimed that
organization reform has in the past mistakenly sought to sharpen the
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differentiation of functions, instead of accepting a concept that functions may appropriately be shared if operational linkages are prescribed to govern the interagency behavior in specified decisional
processes. The nature and significance of interagency linkages in institutional design is a subject that deserves much more investigation
not only for lake/bay management, but for many public sectors
where federal-state-local relations are a central problem.
A final observation or conclusion concerns the need for additional
investigation and research. The kinds of questions raised and typeproblems encountered in exploring the process of designing a
lake/bay agency disclose many areas requiring examination in greater
depth in order to test the validity and utility of the framework and
the process of institutional design derived therefrom. The subjects on
which special investigations are needed are not specifically identified
in this presentation. A major goal of the original study on which this
article is based is to suggest some next steps in research on institutional needs for lake/bay problems.

